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GENERAL SPEED STATUTE VOID FOR VAGUENESS
People v. Firth,
3 N.Y.2d 472, 146 N.E.2d 682 (1957)
The defendant was convicted and fined fifty dollars after a trial
before a Justice of the Peace on an information which charged a violation
of subdivision 1 of section 56 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of New
York reading:
No person shall operate a motor vehicle or a motorcycle upon a
public highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb or
property of any person, nor at a rate of speed greater than will
permit such person to 'bring the vehicle to a stop without injury
to another or his property.
There was testimony that the defendant while passing another car struck
a young girl on a bicycle. While some of the testimony was that the de-
fendant was going sixty to sixty-five miles per hour, he was not charged
with exceeding any of the speeds made unlawful in other subdivisions of
section 56, nor was he charged with reckless driving under another section
of the statute. The Court of Appeals of New York held the subdivision
invalid as it was "too vague and indefinite to constitute a sufficient de-
finition of criminal conduct," and contained no sufficient standard by
which a driver's conduct could be tested.'
The principle that a criminal statute must be definite and clear, and
make known to all the nature of the behavior cited as criminal is widely
recognized. From the earliest English cases all have agreed "that it is
impossible to dissent from the doctrine of Lord Coke, that acts of parlia-
ment ought to be plainly and clearly, and not cunningly and darkly,
penned, especially in legal [penal] matters." 2 In this country the basis of
invalidating vague statutes may be the violation of a due process clause
of a state or the federal constitution,3 or the sixth amendment to the Con-
stitution,4 or a similiar state provision,5 or may never be expressly noted
by the court.' But as with all common principles, the recognition is easier
' People v. Firth, 3 N.Y.2d 472, 146 N.E.2d 682 (1957).
2 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866, 876 (S.D. Iowa 1888) quoting
DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES 652 (1831).
3 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) ; Connally v. General Con-
struction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
U.S. 81 (1921).
4 United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., supra note 3.
5 Wabash Ry. v. O'Bryan, 285 Fed. 583 (E.D. Mo. 1922).
6 In the principal case the statute was not expressly declared unconstitutional
(except in the county court), but was deemed too vague to enforce. In terms of
effect, if there is a distinction here, it is one without a difference. In terms of
theory, it is its vagueness that causes the statute to be unconstitutional. Because
any statute too vague to be enforced is also an unconstitutional statute, once a
statute is found to be too indefinite for application, the court may not necessarily
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than the application.7
The statute in question was passed in 1946 in response to the recom-
mendation of the Governor's Conference on Highway and Traffic Safety
that the state speed laws include a clause to make driving at a speed greater
than that which is reasonable and prudent under the conditions illegal.
Similar statutes have been upheld in most jurisdictions.8 But the statute
go on to spell out the constitutional results of that finding. Railway Comm'n v.
Grand Trunk Ry., 179 Ind. 255, 100 N.E. 852 (1913). See Cook v. State, 26
Ind. App. 278, 59 N.E. 489 (1901). The court in overturning the conviction in
this case expressly noted that the defendant had not properly attempted to have
the law declared unconstitutional as no particular clause of the constitution was
referred to as contravened by the statute.
7 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) ; United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. 1 (1947), where the words, to force employment of a person "in excess of
the employees needed . . . to perform actual services," were held not so vague,
indefinite or uncertain as to violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945), where the Federal Kidnapping
Act was found not to be invalid for uncertainty because of the words "the sen-
tence of death shall not be imposed by the court, if prior to its imposition, the
kidnapped person has been liberated unharmed." The defendant, sentenced to
death, had released the victim with minor injuries. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, supra
note 3, where an attempt to make being a gangster criminal behavior by defining
"gangster" as "any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be
a member of any gang . . . ." was held repugnant to the fourteenth amendment.
International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914); Collins v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 634 (1914). The difficulty of determining when a statute is too vague
is indicated by the fact that most of the cases cited aboXe were split decisions
characterized by strong dissents. See Aigler, Legislation in Fague or General
Terms, 21 MIcH. L. REV. 831 (1923).
8 Illinois v. Beak, 291 Ill. 449, 126 N.E. 201 (1920); Gallaher v. State, 193
Ind. 629, 141 N.E. 347 (1923); State v. Goldstone, 144 Minn. 405, 175 N.W. 892
(1920) ; Ohio v. Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220 (1917) ; State v. Mulkern,
176 Wis. 490, 187 N.V. 190 (1922). Cf. Commonwealth v. Pentz, 247 Mass. 500,
143 N.E. 322 (1924), where the court held constitutional a statute that made it a
crime to operate a motor vehicle "so that the lives or safety of the public might
be endangered"; State v. Lantz, 90 W.Va. 738, 111 S.E. 766 (1922). Contra,
Hayes v. State, 11 Ga.App. 371, 75 S.E. 523 (1912) ; Holland v. State, 11 Ga.App.
769, 76 S.E. 104 (1912); Commonwealth v. Davidson, 21 Pa. Dist. 885 (1912).
Howard v. State, 151 Ga. 845, 108 S.E. 513 (1921), where the words "reasonable
and safe" were held too indefinite a standard to establish criminal liability. The
decision in Hayes v. State, supra, was approved. Cf. Empire Life Insurance Co.
v. Allen, 141 Ga. 413, 81 S.E. 120 (1914). In a dictum this court suggested that
while the words "reasonable and proper" are too indefinite to serve as a test
of criminal responsibility, they may be adequate to establish a standard of civil
responsibility. But see Gaines v. State, 80 Ga.App. 512, 56 S.E.2d 772 (1949).
The court discusses the case of Hayes v. State, supra, and urges that it has been
limited in its application by other decisions, e.g., Ray v. State 47 Ga.App.
22, 169 S.E. 538 (1933), and should only be applied where that precise
question is involved, i.e., a speed statute where the test is a "reasonable and
proper" rate of speed. All states but Delaware, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee,
and Vermont have a general speed prohibition using the reasonable and prudent
or reasonable and proper test, and these tests are approved expressly or by impli-
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as passed omitted the recommended reasonable and prudent test, and its
omission made the statute subject to such extreme interpretations that it was
found too vague and indefinite to be enforced. Despite its legislative his-
tory, the New York Court of Appeals refused to read this test into the
statute.9 Other attacks on the statute prior to the Firth decision had led to
a variety of results."0 The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals on
the issue will end the uncertainty that existed heretofore.
In the principal case the court could not have been unaware of
mounting highway fatalities, in large measure attributable to increased
speed, and the general concern of the state government and the public with
the -problem. Still it was necessary to hold Firth's conviction under the
first subdivision of the law invalid since the law was too vague to be
acceptable. Analysis of the statute shows that it is a crime to set a vehicle
in motion, even at the lowest possible speed, if the vehicle is thereafter in-
volved in an accident which causes injury to another or to his property.
Since it is common experience that many accidents happen without fault or
negligence, the statute imposes criminal liability without fault, and makes
proof of an accident suficient for conviction." The provisions become
meaningless since, as the court says, "there is no such thing as a motor
vehicle speed incapable of endangering life, limb, or property."'
2
cation in almost every state that has adopted them, except Georgia. The Pennsyl-
vania decision cited above, while never expressly overruled, has never been
followed, other Pennsylvania courts reaching an opposite conclusion on the same
statute.
9 A lower New York court in the case of People v. Burkhalder, 203 Misc. 532,
117 N.Y.S.2d 609 (County Ct. 1952) had read the reasonable and prudent test
into this same statute.
10 People v. Wilson, 168 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1957). The court held the
statute constitutional, and a conviction under §56 (1) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
of New York was sustained, the court pointing out that a traffic violation is not a
crime and holding the statute sufficient to support a conviction of a traffic violation.
Section 2 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law provides that offenses against
it are "traffic violations" and not misdemeanors or felonies unless expressly stated.
The court of appeals in the principal case agreed that under New York law
offenses under §56 were traffic violations and not crimes, but held that the con-
stitutional standards were the same. In People v. Horowitz, 3 N.Y.2d. 827, 144-
N.E.2d 655 (1957), the county court's reversal of conviction on insufficient evidence
and constitutional grounds was affirmed on grounds of insufficient evidence.
People v. Furber, 5 Misc.2d 614, 133 N.Y.S.2d 101 (County Ct. 1954) (Appeal
on insufficient evidence; constitutionality was not raised) ; People v. Sprague,
204 Misc. 99, 120 N.Y.S.2d 725 (County Ct. 1953) (Affirms conviction) ; People
v. Roberts, 195 Misc. 172, 89 N.Y.S.2d 367 (County Ct. 1949) where the court
held that the evidence must show a violation of the specific speed prohibitions
in §56(2) or §56(3) to sustain a conviction for violation of §56. People v. Wilson,
supr7, contiins a listing of New-York decisions under this statute.
"lPeople v. Gaebel, 2 Misc.2d. 458, 153 N.Y.S.2d 102 (County Ct. 1956).
Conviction reversed as not supported by the evidence. Dictum suggested the statute
was too vague to be inforced.
12 People v. Firth, supra note 1.
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There is authority under which this statute could be sustained, and the
extreme interpretations suggested by the court need not be made. 3 While
the rules that operate in this area, either to sustain or to invalidate legis-
lation challenged as vague, can be considered helpful in the abstract, their
application to a specific statute will seldom resolve the constitutional ques-
tion. The rules may aid in supporting a decision, but they offer little help
in making it. Ultimate decisions on the actual vagueness of legislation seem
to be made in terms of reasonableness. The rules may help crystallize or
channel judicial thought as the reasonableness of a statute is weighed, but
the end result still seems to -be opinion. 4 Can it be otherwise?
The decision in the principal case warrants an examination of a similar
statute in Ohio which combines a general speed prohibition similar to that
invalidated in the Firth case, but including, as the New York statute did
not, a reasonable nd proper clause, and the assured clear distance rule.15
Both the prohibition and the rule are tied together in the first paragraph of
the statute, and are followed, as in the New York statute, by other para-
graphs containing specific speed provisions.
This combination of the general speed prohibition with the assured
clear distance rule raises interesting constitutional questions which have not
been adjudicated. In Ohio, the general speed prohibition was held to be
constitutional prior to its amendment by the inclusion of the assured clear
13 There is a presumption of a statute's constitutionality. United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1935). A statute can not be set aside for indefiniteness
if it is open to any reasonable construction which will support it. State v. Dvoracek,
140 Iowa 266, 118 N.W. 399 (1908) ; State v. West Side St. Ry., 146 Mo. 155, 47
S.W. 959 (1898). The courts should not declare a statute void on the ground that
the statute is unintelligible and meaningless in a doubtful case. State ex rel. Forch-
heimer v. LeBlond, 108 Ohio St. 41, N.E. 491 (1923). See People v. Bulkhalder,
supra note 9, a lower court decision where the statute in the principal case is
sustained, but where proof of an accident is not regarded as sufficient for con-
viction, and the extreme interpretation made by the Firth court is avoided.
14 Compare, State v. Scofield, 138 A.2d 415 (R.I. 1958) with State v. Pigge, 322
P.2d 703 (Idaho 1957), where similar statutes were under consideration. In the
latter case, a statute prohibiting the operation of any motor vehicle upon the public
highways in such a manner as to endanger or be likely to endanger any persons
or property, was found to be unconstitutional and void for uncertainty. In the
former, a statute reading, "Reckless driving.-Any person who operates a motor
vehicle on any of the highways of this state recklessly so as to endanger the lives
or safety of the public shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," was found to be con-
stitutional, and not too indefinite and uncertain. Neither decision seems unreasonable.
15 OHIo REV. CODE §4511.12 (1953), as amended (Page's Supp. 1957). "No
person shall operate a motor vehicle . . . in and upon the streets and highways at
a speed greater or less than is reasonable or proper, having due regard to the
traffic, surface, and width of the street or highway and any other conditions, and
no person shall drive any motor vehicle . . . in and upon any street or highway
at a greater speed than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured
clear distance ahead."
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distance rule."8 In the only other state where a similar statute has been
challenged, the validity of the general speed prohibition was questioned,
but not that of the assured clear distance rule." Therefore we have no
decision on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the assured clear
distance rule. Perhaps one reason for this is the apparent reluctance of
prosecuting attorneys to use the rule to impose criminal liability. The de-
fendant, in cases where the assured clear distance rule seems to have been
violated, is tried for reckless driving, for violation of the general or specific
speed prohibitions, or for manslaughter based on the violation of these
statutes."8 And when an attempt to utilize the rule for a criminal pro-
secution was made, the judiciary seemed equally reluctant to apply it. 9 A
search of recorded cases supports, by absence of example, the conclusion
that the predication of criminal liability on the violation of the assured
clear distance rule alone has not yet received the blessing of any court of
record. Yet the rule is drafted as a prohibition, a penalty for violation is
provided, and it is utilized by the state highway patrol as a basis for cita-
tions.2° It has, however, received frequent use in civil cases either to estab-
lish negligence per se2 or contributory negligence,2 2 the courts saying the
rule sets a standard of care. 3 If the rule can not be constitutionally used
to subject an offender to criminal liability, it still may be used by the courts
16Ohio v. Schaeffer, supra note 8. The assured clear distance rule was
enacted in 1929 and added to the speeding prohibition which was then contained
in OHIo GEN. CoDE §6307-21.
17 Iowa v. Coppes, 247 Iowa 1057, 78 N.W.2d 10 (1956). In Commonwealth
v. Klick, 164 Pa.Super. 449, 65 A.2d 440 (1949), the court held the constitutional
issues had not been properly raised, but added gratuitously that they had no merit.
The assured clear distance rule was not mentioned. In Oklahoma and Michigan,
the only other states which have the assured clear distance rule in its statutory
form, the statute has apparently not been questioned.
18 Ohio v. Wells, 146 Ohio St. 131, 64 N.E.2d 593 (1945) ; State v. Cheatwood,
84 Ohio App. 125, 82 N.E.2d. 770 (1948); Ohio v. Brookman, 52 Ohio Op. 283,
112 N.E.2d. 416 (1952).
19 State v. Cheatwood, supra note 18. Manslaughter counts based on reckless
driving, and the general speed prohibition and the assured clear distance rule,
were affirmed on violation of the general speed prohibition-the jury found the
defendant had not violated the reckless driving statute-after court agreement that
the defendant had violated the assured clear distance rule, the court saying "can
and must be sustained on" violation of the general speed prohibition. (Italics
added.)
20The highway patrol automatically gives a citation based on violation of
OHio REV. CODE §4511.21 (1953), as amended, in any accident involving a rear
end collision.
21 Lukin v. Marvel, 219 Iowa 773, 259 N.W. 782 (1935); Bowmaster v.
DePree Co., 252 Mich. 505, 233 N.W. 395 (1930).
22 Gumley v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36, 193 N.E. 627 (1934); Skinner v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722 (1933).
23 Skinner v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 22.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
as a civil standard. 4 If the assured clear distance rule establishes a criminal
offense-as it apparently attempts to do-then the rule raises the same
question as the Firth case: whether it is certain enough and is not so vague
and indefinite as to be a violation of due process. An argument can be
made on both sides of the issue. From the discussions of the rule in the
cases it is difficult to tell whether the courts view this part of the statute as
creating a criminal offense, a civil standard, or both. The cases can best
be harmonized by regarding the rule as having both a criminal and civil
effect. Since the rule is not expressly made a standard of care by the
legislature, its civil effect is solely the result of its acceptance as such by
the courts.
Returning to the principal case, the situation in New York is not
greatly changed by the decision that the general prohibition is too vague
to be a basis for criminal liability, for the specific prohibitions on excessive
speeds remain in effect. The vagueness of the subdivision invalidated could
have permitted local law enforcement officers-in cases where insufficient
evidence was available to convict under the specific speed prohibitions, or
under the reckless driving statute-to attach criminal sanctions to an
individual's conduct. The possibility of arbitrary action is one factor to
consider when general speed statutes are in question. "It follows that in
deciding upon the admissibility of flexible or indefinite terms, regard must
be had to the circumstances under which, the persons by whom, and the
sense of responsibility with which, the law will be applied, and to the con-
sequences which an error will entail." 2 The same consideration applies
to the assured clear distance rule. Perhaps the best argument against gene-
ral speed prohibitions, with or without the assured clear distance rule, is
that even if they can be sustained constitutionally, they are not needed
to protect the public considering the other statutes available in this area.
John Yeatmn Taggart
24 Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943); Empire Life
Insurance Co. v. Allen, supra note 8; Strickland v. Whatley, 142 Ga. 802, 83
S.E. 856 (1914); Solan & Billings v. Pasche, 153 S.W. 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913);
Houston & T.C. Ry. v. Stevenson, 29 S.W.2d 995 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
25 Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L. J. 438 (1921).
